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Abstract 
 
This article examines patterns of women's cabinet representation across all presidential 
democracies in East and Southeast Asia since democratization. It demonstrates how the choice of 
female ministers differs across career backgrounds in presidential systems and further examines 
why young presidential systems in Asia are conducive to women's access to ministerial power 
through professional career tracks. We argue that despite women's successful performance in 
national legislative elections, women have been restricted to access the power resources 
necessary to target other political goals, such as cabinet positions, whereas democratic transition 
has provided broader avenues for women to emerge as professionals outside party politics. By 
analyzing original data on female ministers in East and Southeast Asia, the study finds that the 
share of women among professional ministers has increased over time, but women's share among 
political ministers has not changed significantly. Additionally, the different qualifications of 
female politicians and professionals also make them eligible for appointment to different types of 
policy areas in terms of prestige and gender. Our analysis suggests that women's cabinet 
representation has improved overall since democratic transition in Asia, but this improvement 
disguises contrasting outcomes in women's cabinet status according to their career backgrounds. 
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In this article, we explore women's representation in top executive posts of presidential systems 
in East and Southeast Asia (henceforth East Asia) that are characterized by the rise of female 
heads of state and the increasing proportion of female legislators. South Korea (2013), Taiwan 
(2016), and the Philippines (2016) have all seen female candidates elected as presidents or vice 
presidents by outperforming male candidates in national executive elections. The increase in 
women's legislative representation is also remarkable: as of 2016, 38% of legislators in Taiwan 
and 30% of Philippine representatives (lower chamber) are women. On average, women's 
representation in lower or single chambers of parliament in Asian democracies has doubled from 
10.3% in 1993 to 22.3% in 2013.1
 To account for the variation in women's appointment to ministerial positions across cases 
and over time in East Asian presidential democracies, we focus on (1) women's empowerment 
through political and professional careers since democratization and (2) the policy areas female 
ministers are more likely to represent versus their male counterparts. We first discuss how the 
prevalence of female ministers differs across career backgrounds in presidential systems and 
further examine why young democracies in East Asia may be conducive to women's access to 
 Nonetheless, as illustrated in the following section, women's 
rise to ministerial power among female legislators has been surprisingly limited. Studies of 
women's representation in cabinets have provided important knowledge about the influence of 
political, socioeconomic, and institutional factors on this representation (Davis, 1997; Escobar-
Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Krook & O'Brien, 2012; Reynolds, 1999; Siaroff, 2000; 
Studlar & Moncrief 1997; Whitford, Wilkins, & Ball 2007). However, while existing research on 
women ministers heavily focuses on other regions, including America, Europe, and Africa, Asian 
countries have been largely overlooked in the comparative literature, despite the important roles 
of cabinet appointments in stabilizing new democracies in the region (e.g., Slater, 2004). 
                                                 
1 As of 2010, the representation of women in legislatures is 16.9% globally (Bauer & Tremblay, 2011, p. 1). 
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ministerial power through professional career tracks. Then we look into how female ministers' 
career backgrounds influence types of policy areas they are more likely to represent vis-à-vis 
their male counterparts.  
 Presidential democracies in East Asia provide useful cases to examine distinct courses of 
women's ascendance to cabinet posts. The third wave of democratization throughout the region 
in the 1980's and 1990's has brought wider avenues for women to emerge as professionals who 
may help democratic presidents signal their commitment to administrative and social reform 
(Clark & Lee, 2000). An increasing proportion of female career civil servants and doctoral-
degree holders in some of these countries has expanded a potential pool for female top executive 
officials. In contrast, women's advancement to ministerial positions has been relatively limited 
through political career tracks in East Asia. Despite women's successful performance in national 
legislative elections, women have been still restricted to access the power resources necessary to 
target other political goals (Batto, 2014; Thompson, 2015), such as cabinet positions.  
 In exploring the linkage between democratization, gender, and cabinet portfolios, we 
analyze original data on female cabinet ministers in all presidential democracies in East Asia 
from the time of their democratic transition through 2013. We find that, in general, women's 
access to ministerial power has increased since democratization. However, we also find different 
trends of women's access to cabinet posts for legislators and nonpolitical professionals. While 
the share of women among professional ministers has increased over time, women's share among 
political ministers has not changed significantly. With respect to portfolio allocation, female 
ministers are overall more likely to hold low-prestige and "feminine" posts and less likely to 
receive high-prestige portfolios than their male counterparts (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2005; Krook & O'Brien, 2012), but the different qualifications of female politicians 
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and female professionals make them eligible for appointment to different policy areas. The 
likelihood of female politicians receiving posts concerning the public sphere of politics is not 
significantly different from that of male politicians. In addition, the likelihood of female 
professionals accessing gender-neutral portfolios is not significantly different from that of male 
professionals.  
 Given the central roles cabinet ministers play in policy making and implementation, it is 
critical to understand the ways in which women can access these positions and the policy areas 
that are given to women to represent as influential policy managers. Since personnel allocation 
influences the policies chief executives choose and affects the degree of accountability and 
responsiveness to constituents their policies represent, women's inclusion in cabinets can wield 
considerable influence over women's descriptive and substantive representation. Women's 
representation in cabinets, for example, leads to expanded female-friendly social policy 
(Atchison & Down, 2009). Countries with greater numbers of female ministers are also more 
likely to adopt state bureaucracies for gender mainstreaming (True & Mintrom, 2001). More 
importantly, having a female high-ranking official may enhance public perceptions of female 
managers' effectiveness, allowing other female officials to rise to the upper echelons of 
government (Jalalzai, 2008, 2013; Jalalzai & Krook, 2010).2
 
  
Distinct Patterns of Women's Representation in Presidential Cabinets in East Asia  
Asian women's share of cabinet positions has gradually increased since the region's 
democratization and political liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s (Fleschenberg, 2011; 
Tremblay & Bauer, 2011), replicating "a worldwide association between greater democracy and 
                                                 
2 Vice Minister Lee Bok-sil of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in South Korea (personal communication, 
April 19, 2016). 
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improved women's cabinet participation" (Arriola & Johnson, 2014, p. 496; see also Davis, 1997; 
Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Krook & O'Brien, 2012; Reynolds, 1999; Studlar 
& Moncrief, 1997). While growing attention has been devoted to the appointment of female 
ministers in general, the choice of women for these positions is still perceived as an uncommon 
case in many presidential democracies. According to comparative work on cabinet appointment 
in presidential democracies, a separation of powers between executive and legislature shapes 
conditions where ministers are more or less likely to be selected into cabinet positions depending 
on their political affiliation. The gender and candidate selection literature also acknowledges 
"background characteristics as a proxy measure of abilities and character" (Norris & Lovenduski, 
1995, p. 14). Yet, existing studies of gender and cabinets around the world rarely disaggregate 
women on the basis of their main career backgrounds to examine whether there are distinct 
patterns for their representation in cabinets.  
 Figure 1 describes the patterns of female ministers' access to cabinet posts, separating 
those with political and professional career backgrounds, in 21 presidential administrations from 
four East Asian democracies – Indonesia (1999-2013), the Philippines (1986-2013), South Korea 
(1988-2013), and Taiwan (1993-2013) – between the respective years of their democratic 
transition and 2013. Here, the Polity score, which lists a political regime ranging from 6 to 10 as 
a democracy, is used to determine the respective beginning year of democracy for these countries. 
Within these cases, the composition of cabinets was observed on a yearly basis using a list of 
ministers and their portfolio from the CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of 
Foreign Governments. Following the definition from the literature on cabinet appointments (e.g., 
Amorim Neto, 2006), political ministers are those affiliated with and representing political 
parties in the cabinet, whereas professional ministers are policy experts in their fields who are 
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not affiliated with any party at their appointment. Information on the backgrounds and party 
affiliations of ministers was collected from multiple sources including academic publications, 
local archives, news reports, and websites. 
 Of the 1,257 ministers in the dataset, 129 (about 10.3%) are women. Every 
administration included in the analysis has also chosen at least one female minister. However, 
Figure 1 reveals a stark contrast between political and professional women's access to cabinet 
posts. While only one administration in Southeast Asia (Indonesia) has failed to have a female 
professional minister, five administrations in Southeast Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines) have 
never appointed a female political minister. Across and within states, female professionals' 
access to cabinet posts has increased over time, but female politicians' access to power has been 
very limited. Appointments of female politicians to the cabinet, for example, have been stagnant 
in the Philippines and South Korea and are even decreasing in Indonesia. Given the impressive 
record of increases in women's legislative representation in these countries, the notable intra-
gender difference in women's cabinet representation is puzzling. To understand these patterns 
and the role of women ministers in the governance of presidential democracies, we need a 
framework that connects appointments of women to cabinets to both women's empowerment 
through political and professional careers and to the specific policy areas they represent, 
examining gender as "a main cross-cutting category of democratic politics and policy making" 
(Fleschenberg & Derichs, 2011, p. 9). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Democratization and Women's Representation in Presidential Cabinets 
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Scholars of gender and politics have analyzed the determinants of women's presence in cabinets 
and found the demand for women ministers in presidential cabinets is a function of political 
benefits and costs of appointing woman to a post (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005). 
Although we agree that political calculations of such benefits and costs should play a role in the 
choice of female ministers, we disagree with the view that female ministers will be appointed 
solely for their gender without regard to their qualifications for the position. The observation of 
actual appointments of women to cabinets reveals two major gaps in the literature. First, women 
ministers are marked by their heterogeneity of career backgrounds in the literature (Borrelli, 
2002; Davis, 1997; Norris & Lovenduski, 1995; Siaroff, 2000), but little is known about why 
women with particular backgrounds are more likely to ascend to power. Second, scholars of 
presidents and cabinets suggest that the aims of presidents in choosing ministers in institutional 
separation of powers systems differ depending on the ministers' affiliation with political parties 
(Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Samuels & Shugart, 2010), an 
argument that is overlooked in existing work on female ministers. Together, these trends imply 
that there should be multiple pathways toward ministerial power for women of various career 
backgrounds in the cabinet.  
 Although women's access to cabinet posts is important in all circumstances, it deserves 
particular attention in presidential democracies. Before examining the role gender plays in the 
distribution of cabinet offices, it is important to understand how the appointment process is 
shaped by the institutional separation of powers. In these systems, party organizations are shaped 
in a way that a president, a de facto party leader in the governmental arena, can choose cabinet 
members without much intervention from her party (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). In contrast to 
parliamentary democracies, where a prime minister is a loyal representative of her parliamentary 
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party, a president "will stand for election on a personal platform rather than the party platform" 
and, once elected, may choose ministers beyond the party line even at the expense of her 
organization (Elgie, 2011, p. 395; see also Samuels & Shugart, 2010). The aims of presidents in 
selecting ministers and the qualifications of these ministers are also clearly distinguished 
according to their career backgrounds. While appointing political ministers can help to shore up 
legislative support for a president's policy programs, naming professional nonpartisans in the 
cabinet may provide advantages for managing policy implementation (Amorim Neto, 2006; 
Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Existing research on female ministers also acknowledges 
the importance of the constitutional design and executive-legislative relations in determining 
women's access to ministerial posts (Jalalzai, 2013; Krook & O'Brien, 2012). However, the 
failure of the literature to distinguish female ministers according to their career backgrounds, 
particularly their political affiliation, and to further recognize their distinct patterns of access to 
ministerial power obfuscates any causal link between when and where women with particular 
backgrounds are more likely to rise and their actual representation in cabinets. 
 In this article, we argue that presidents may have to limit female representation among 
political ministers, because there are relatively fewer women who can exert legislators' influence 
in policy formulation on behalf of them. According to the candidate selection literature, political 
parties should play a central role in the supply of female political elites to cabinet positions 
(Barnea & Rahat, 2007; Field & Siavelis, 2008; Krook, 2010; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993, 1995). 
Yet, in political environments of young democracies, parties often show lower degrees of 
inclusiveness and higher degrees of leadership control in the candidate selection procedures due 
to the nature of greater political uncertainty and higher party fluidity (Field & Siavelis, 2008, pp. 
630-632). Such political environments tend to allow only limited female representation. It is 
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often male leaders who can secure access to a party's resources, build political networks that 
would grant them larger influence, and ultimately make decisions on candidate selection 
procedures. Politically active women have had to rely on men to access their party's resources 
and organized interests, and therefore, relatively few women have had the political connections 
necessary to pursue other political goals (Arriola & Johnson, 2014; Beck, 2003). Therefore, 
when presidents appoint ministers who can shore up political support for their policy agenda and 
their administration, such constraints prevent them from choosing more women among 
politicians.3
 The nature of party politics and its candidate selection procedures in East Asian young 
democracies provides a clear answer to the puzzle of why women's access to cabinet positions 
has been constrained through political careers. Although we have seen the election of female 
presidents and vice presidents and the increasing proportion of female legislators in East Asia, 
only a few women who inherited their family members' political legacy are in an initially 
advantageous position to succeed (Derichs & Thompson, 2013; Thompson, 2015). While 
adopting gender quotas in Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan has helped to boost the 
electability of female candidates, it has not necessarily led to the increasing supply of female 
political elites equipped with the power resources and political connections needed for other 
political positions (Batto, 2014; Thompson, 2015). Moreover, centralized and exclusionary 
candidate selection procedures, controlled by male-dominated and personalistic parties, have 
been unfavorable to women's selection and succession into leadership positions with party 
organizations. In South Korea, female candidates have been more often nominated for 
proportional representation (PR) seats than allowed to compete for single-member district (SMD) 
seats where they can accumulate political resources (Lee & Shin, 2016). Similarly, in Taiwan, 
 
                                                 
3 Legislator Mei-nu Yu in Taiwan (personal communication, February 6, 2018). 
9 
 
women have been more likely to be nominated as PR-tier candidates rather than SMD-tier 
candidates, particularly under the new electoral rule since 2008, and once elected, female 
legislators have been assigned to low-prestige committees rather than key issue committees and 
have been less able to take active committee leadership positions such as conveners, blocking 
their accumulation of power (Batto, 2014). In Indonesia, although recent electoral reform into 
open-list PR with a gender quota and placement mandate led to the election of more women than 
before, with weak party support and resource bases, it is not certain whether this positive change 
will lead to more women in the cabinet (Bessell, 2010).  
 On the other hand, presidents may enhance female representation among professional 
ministers, because there are increasingly more women who can provide expertise for managing 
policy implementation. Not only has the immature party system of young democracies made East 
Asian government more conducive to nonpartisanship in the cabinet, women in East Asia have 
been able to advance as professionals in diverse fields outside party politics, such as academia, 
public service, journalism, and art. Since democratization, the increasing proportion of women 
who hold doctoral degrees or pass national civil service exams has expanded a potential pool of 
professional women who are eligible for high-ranking government offices in South Korea and 
Taiwan. Moreover, democratic transition has provided broader avenues for a better-organized 
women's movement and the emergence of women as leaders of independent interest groups and 
reform advocates who promote social change, both factors pushing governments to enact 
necessary reforms (Clark & Lee, 2000). For chief executives in young democracies who intend 
to signal their commitment to reform and better policy performance, women with policy 
expertise and reputations as social activists have been precious cabinet appointees (Arriola & 
Johnson, 2014). In East Asia, such cases have never been rare. In the Philippines, Corazon 
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Soliman, a leader in the civil society community, was appointed to connect the government and 
civil society as a secretary of the Social Welfare and Development Department.4
 
 Sri Mulyani 
Indrawati of Indonesia, an executive director on the board of the International Monetary Fund 
known as a tough reformist, was appointed to lead national economic policy as a finance minister 
for five years. In sum, we predict that democratic transition has led to distinct patterns of 
women's cabinet representation according to their career backgrounds.   
Hypothesis 1: The age of democracy will increase the share of females among 
professional ministers. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The share of females among political ministers may not increase 
with the age of democracy.  
 
 
 We further examine the process of portfolio allocation to confirm whether appointees' 
qualifications as well as their gender are considered for cabinet appointments. Studies of gender 
and cabinets commonly find gendered patterns in portfolio allocation: female ministers are more 
likely to be assigned to low-prestige and "feminine" offices and are less likely to receive high-
prestige posts (Borrelli, 2002; Davis, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2009; 
Lovenduski, 1986; Martin, 2003; Reynolds, 1999; Studlar & Moncrief, 1999). Given that the 
overall status of women remains marginal in cabinets around the world (Bauer & Tremblay, 
2011), we might see these patterns persist in East Asian presidential cabinets. Yet, we also 
predict to witness an evolving trend of women's appointments that is characterized by female 
politicians and female professionals being more likely to receive certain posts fitting their 
résumés. 
                                                 
4 Secretary C. Soliman in the Philippines (personal interview, May 6, 2013). 
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 Indeed, the executive allocation of cabinet seats in East Asia has been made in ways that 
they are distributed to ministers whose qualifications are most suitable to manage relevant policy 
areas (Lee, 2015), and we believe women's cabinet appointments will not deviate from this norm. 
As examined above, women are sometimes appointed to the cabinet from among the ranks of 
parliamentarians due to their extensive political experience; at other times, women are recruited 
to the cabinet from outside party politics due to their professional expertise. Evidence from East 
Asian presidential systems also indicates that female political candidates have no inferior 
qualifications to their male counterparts (Huang, 2016). Therefore, the types of posts assigned to 
women will map closely onto their career backgrounds (see Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2005; Krook & O'Brien, 2012 for details of classification).  
 Cabinet portfolios concerning "the public sphere of politics" (masculine posts) are more 
often delegated to women with political influence (Krook & O'Brien, 2012, p. 844). On the other 
hand, ministries that are responsible for controlling public-goods provisions (medium-prestige 
posts) may be a better fit for women with policy expertise (Krook & O'Brien, 2012, p. 845). In 
addition, as occurs commonly in Africa, Europe, and Latin America (Arriola & Johnson, 2014; 
Davis, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Siaroff, 2000), increasing 
opportunities for women with professional expertise to access cabinet positions may enable 
female professionals to become eligible for "gender-neutral" posts. Therefore, we predict that:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of female politicians accessing posts concerning the 
public sphere of politics (masculine posts) is not significantly different from that 
of male politicians. 
 
Hypothesis 4a: The likelihood of female professionals accessing public-goods 
related posts (medium-prestige posts) is not significantly different from that of 
male professionals.  
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Hypothesis 4b: The likelihood of female professionals accessing gender-neutral 
posts is not significantly different from that of male professionals.  
 
 
 
Data and Methods 
Dependent Variables 
To test our hypotheses, we use two sets of original data on ministerial appointments to 
presidential cabinets in four East Asian democracies from the respective years of their 
democratic transition through 2013. We employ the cabinet-level dataset, presented in Figure 1, 
to test the first two hypotheses and the individual-level dataset, based on the same sources, to test 
the last two hypotheses.  
 For our analyses, we adopt two different sets of dependent variables. In order to test 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, we introduce three dependent variables to estimate three models, 
respectively (Table 1). Model 1 uses the proportion of cabinet seats occupied by women as the 
dependent variable. We employ this model as the benchmark against the two following models, 
examining the overall status of women's representation in East Asian presidential cabinets. For 
the dependent variable of Model 2, we use women's cabinet representation among political 
ministers, measured by the number of cabinet seats held by female politicians out of the total 
cabinet seats held by politicians. In Model 3, the dependent variable is women's cabinet 
representation among professional ministers, measured by the number of cabinet seats held by 
female professionals out of the total cabinet seats held by professionals.  
 To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, we introduce six dichotomous variables as our dependent 
variables, following the template devised by Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005, p. 
833) and Krook and O'Brien (2012, pp. 844-845): three variables in the prestige type and three 
variables in the gender type. By these criteria, portfolios are categorized as high-prestige, 
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medium-prestige, and low-prestige (prestige type), and masculine, neutral, and feminine (gender 
type). First, with regard to the prestige type of positions, high-prestige positions involve the most 
important policy areas, such as economic management, foreign affairs, national defense, and 
internal affairs. Medium-prestige posts involve policy areas concerning the government's role as 
a public goods provider, including education, environment and natural resources, health and 
social welfare, and transportation and communication. Low-prestige positions cover such areas 
as children and family, culture and tourism, and women's affairs. Second, in terms of the gender 
type of positions, masculine posts typically concern the public sphere of politics and the 
economy and have been historically associated with men, whereas feminine posts concern the 
private sphere of home and the family and have been closely connected to women (Krook & 
O'Brien, 2012, p. 844). The former posts include ministries such as agriculture, defense, finance, 
foreign affairs, and labor, and the latter posts are composed of topics like children, education, 
health, and women's affairs. Gender-neutral posts typically include energy, justice, and tourism. 
Therefore, our dependent variables in Models 4 through 9 in Table 2 and in Models 10 through 
15 in Table 3 are whether political and professional ministers, respectively, hold these specific 
types of portfolios. 
 
Independent and Control Variables 
For our analyses, we have two main independent variables. To test the first two hypotheses, 
which concern changes in women's share of cabinet posts with the age of democracy, we include 
the number of years since the country’s democratic transition. Since the impact of the 
consolidation of democracy on women's cabinet representation is not immediate and not 
perfectly linear, we take the log of a year and use a year of time lag for this variable. To test for 
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gender effects in portfolio allocation (H3 and H4), we include a dichotomous variable which 
takes the value 1 if ministers are female.  
 Beyond the key covariates, we also include several additional variables to control for 
factors that may otherwise affect the results in systematic ways. First, we include a set of 
variables that shape the dynamics of executive-legislative relations and might affect the 
executive choice of female ministers in presidential democracies: constitutional powers, 
presidents' support in legislature, electoral cycle, and term limits. The first control variable, 
constitutional powers, measures formal powers granted to the president. We adopt the 
classification by Shugart and Carey (1992, p. 150) and apply their ordinal scales to information 
from the constitutions of the four East Asian democracies and other academic sources (see 
Kasuya, 2013, pp. 16-24). The second control variable, presidents' support in legislature, 
measures a president's partisan powers based on their capacity to shape the policymaking process 
that comes from the president's standing in relation to the party system (Shugart & Mainwaring, 
1997). As a measure of a president's partisan strength, we employ the proportion of seats 
occupied by the president's party in the lower or only chamber (Cheibub, 2007, p. 75). The third 
control variable, electoral cycle, measures the number of months left until the end of the 
president's term (Shugart & Carey, 1992). The fourth control variable, term limits, measures 
whether a president can run for re-election or not. This is a dichotomous variable that gives a 
value of 1 if a president can seek re-election and 0 otherwise. We predict that these variables will 
be significantly associated with women's share of cabinet posts if gendered patterns of women's 
cabinet representation are in action in presidential democracies. 
 Second, we control for variables that may significantly affect the choice of female 
ministers as indicated in the literature. Given the rise of female heads of state in East Asian 
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democracies, it is of interest to test whether female presidents are more likely to appoint women 
to the cabinet. We also account for whether presidents are from a left party as female ministers 
may be more likely to emerge in left-leaning governments (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2005, p. 831).5
 Lastly, we also include a set of variables concerning women's participation in national 
legislatures and women's status in society: the percentage of seats occupied by women in the 
lower (or only) chamber, the proportion of the labor force composed of women, and the overall 
level of a country's socioeconomic development (Arriola & Johnson, 2014; Escobar-Lemmon & 
Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Krook & O'Brien, 2012).
 In addition, we control for the magnitude of cabinet reshuffling by 
including the proportion of cabinet seats replaced in a given year as female ministers may have 
more chances to be selected with a major cabinet reshuffle (Borrelli, 2002).  
6
 In the individual-level models (Tables 2 and 3), other than these control variables, we 
include a set of variables characterizing ministers' biographical, educational, and political 
backgrounds: age (in years), education (1 if the minister has a bachelor's as the highest degree, 2 
if the minister has a master's as the highest degree, and 3 if the minister has a doctoral degree), 
and legislative experience (the length of service as a member of the legislature in years). 
Descriptive statistics for all independent and control variables are presented in the appendix.  
 We expect 
women's share of cabinet posts to be greater when values on these measures and conditions are 
higher.  
                                                 
5 To measure this variable, we follow Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005), thereby coding "whether the 
president was to the left or right of the second-place finisher" (834). The data sources for this variable are Dalton 
and Tanaka (2008) and multiple news reports and websites. 
6 The percentage of seats occupied by women in the lower chamber is based on data from the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union. The proportion of the labor force composed of women is based on data from the World Bank's Gender 
Statistics Data Base. The overall level of a country's socioeconomic development is based on the United Nations 
Development Programme's Human Development Index. The data sources for these variables in Taiwan are the 
Legislative Yuan website (http://www.ly.gov.tw/innerIndex.action) and the Executive Yuan's Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Stataistics website (http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1).   
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Model Choice  
We use two different analytical methods to estimate models based on two datasets in different 
levels. First, we estimate women's share of cabinet appointments using Generalized Estimating 
Equations (GEE) to address estimation issues concerning the time-series cross-sectional structure 
of our dataset (Zorn, 2001). Changes in cabinet formation frequently occur during presidential 
terms in East Asia (Lee, 2015), and 35% of the ministers in our sample serve less than a year. 
We thus model women's cabinet share yearly, because cabinet shuffles typically happen several 
times a year. We also correct for serial autocorrelation, particularly first-order autocorrelation 
within each case, by using GEE. This approach has been used by Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-
Robinson (2005) to estimate women's cabinet representation for proportion data that are time-
series cross-sectional. Second, for an individual-level analysis, we use logistic analysis to 
estimate the likelihood of political and professional female ministers holding any of the six 
different types of posts across the prestige and gender criteria. In all models, we estimate 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms 
of spatial and temporal dependence and also include country-level fixed effects to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity across East Asian countries.  
 
Results  
The results of our analyses, presented in Tables 1 through 3, support the main argument 
developed in this article. With the age of democracy in East Asia, women are more likely to 
ascend to ministerial power through professional expertise but still have limited access to cabinet 
posts through political career tracks. While women are generally more likely to be assigned to 
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low-prestige and feminine posts and less likely to receive high-prestige posts, the different 
qualifications of female politicians and professionals make them more eligible for particular 
types of cabinet positions. These results are robust after including relevant political and 
socioeconomic controls. Specific results are discussed below. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 In Table 1, the findings associated with the development of democracy suggest that while 
women's access to ministerial power has increased over time, it has trended differently 
depending on their career backgrounds. In Model 1, the estimated coefficient on the age of 
democracy is positive and statistically significant. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, the age of 
democracy has a positive and statistically significant impact in Model 3 but fails to reach 
statistical significance in Model 2. As democracy matures in East Asia, cabinet positions have 
become increasingly accessible to female professionals, but the same has not happened for 
female politicians. According to Models 1 and 3, increasing the age of democracy by 10 percent 
would lead to a 2 percentage point increase in women's overall share of cabinet ministers and a 
1.1 percentage point increase in women's share of professional ministers, holding all other 
variables constant.  
 Some of our control variables also produce interesting results. First, a set of four controls 
that shape the dynamics of executive-legislative relations show significant and consistent results 
across Models 1 and 3. In both models, the coefficients on constitutional powers are negative, 
but the coefficients on presidents' support in legislature, electoral cycle, and term limits are 
positive. While women's shares among cabinet ministers and professional ministers are reduced 
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as presidential constitutional powers increase, these shares are likely to increase when presidents 
gain legislative support, are earlier in their terms, and can run for re-election. Some of these 
findings confirm the literature suggesting that the electoral calendar influences a president's 
momentum to choose a female minister (Borrelli, 2002). At the beginning of the term, newly 
elected presidents enjoying a honeymoon period may be more likely to risk selecting a female 
minister. Further research on this subject will shed light on demand-side factors for women's 
cabinet representation by examining the relationship between the political dynamics of 
executive-legislative relations and presidential incentives to select female ministers.  
 Second, our control variables from the gender and cabinets literature provide insights for 
democratic politics in East Asia. The coefficients on female presidents are positive and 
statistically significant in Model 3 but fail to attain statistical significance in Model 2, suggesting 
that only women's share of professional ministers is greater under female presidents. Although 
female leaders want to hire more female politicians into the cabinet, they often face a relatively 
small pool of qualified female politicians (Norris & Lovenduski, 1993, 1995; Jensen, 2008), 
thereby possibly appointing more female professionals instead. Consider the first female 
president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-wen's cabinet appointments. Although Tsai was expected to 
choose more female ministers, she selected only one female politician for her cabinet; instead, 
she appointed three more female professionals to the cabinet. The coefficients on left party are 
statistically significant and negative in Model 2 but positive in Model 3, suggesting that left-
leaning governments reduce women's share of political ministers but enhance women's share of 
professional ministers. This finding is partially consistent with previous research on female 
ministers (Krook & O'Brien, 2012; Reynolds, 1999), and future research can unpack the reasons 
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why left-leaning governments adopt separate recruitment decisions for female ministers across 
career backgrounds.  
 In addition, a few of the estimated coefficients on political and socioeconomic controls 
attain statistical significance. In Models 1 and 2, women's labor force participation has a negative 
and statistically significant effect on women's cabinet share. The findings related to women's 
labor force participation, however, are not consistent across existing studies; some have found 
them to be positive (Krook & O'Brien, 2012), others observed negative results (Arriola & 
Johnson, 2014), and still others found no statistical significance (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2005). The coefficient on a country's socioeconomic development level is positive and 
statistically significant in Model 1, consistent with the literature (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2005).  
 The results in Table 1 are based on women's appointment to cabinets. However, our 
hypotheses further examine the relationship between women's particular backgrounds and the 
policy areas they are more likely to represent than their male counterparts. In Tables 2 and 3, the 
empirical results suggest that women's status is still marginalized in East Asian presidential 
cabinets as they are more likely to be assigned to positions in less important issue areas, but they 
also tend to receive posts that match the characteristics of their career backgrounds. These 
findings are robust to the inclusion of ministers' biographical, educational, and political 
backgrounds.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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 Table 2 presents the results of a logistic analysis of female political ministers and their 
portfolio assignments. In Model 7, the coefficient on gender is negative but fails to reach 
statistical significance. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, female political ministers had no 
significant difference in receiving posts concerning the public sphere of politics ("masculine" 
portfolios) than their male counterparts. While this finding supports our argument that women 
will receive certain posts fitting their résumés, we also confirm gendered patterns in portfolio 
allocation. The coefficients on gender are statistically significant and negative in Model 4 but 
positive in Models 6 and 9, suggesting that female politicians overall were more likely to receive 
low-prestige and "feminine" posts and less likely to hold high-prestige posts than male 
politicians (Borrelli, 2002; Davis, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2009; Krook & 
O'Brien, 2012). They have an 11% lower likelihood of a high-prestige appointment, a 23.9% 
higher chance of attaining a low-prestige post, and a 36.3% higher probability of receiving a 
feminine ministry portfolio allocation than their male counterparts. Additionally, the coefficients 
on gender are negative in both Models 5 and 8 but fail to attain statistical significance in the 
latter model. While female politicians were less likely to receive medium-prestige posts (13.1%), 
they had no significant difference in  holding gender-neutral posts than their male counterparts. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 Table 3 presents the results related to female professional ministers and their portfolio 
assignments. In Models 11 and 14, the coefficients on gender are negative but do not reach 
statistical significance in the latter only, which confirms Hypothesis 4b but not Hypothesis 4a. 
Female professionals were indeed not less likely to hold gender-neutral posts but were less likely 
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to receive posts related to public-goods provisions (medium-prestige portfolios) than their male 
counterparts. As the age of democracy in East Asia increases, we correctly predicted women's 
increasing ascension to ministerial power through professional fields, but their access to 
conventionally male-dominated policy areas shows mixed signals. Similar to their political 
sisters, professional female ministers were overall more likely to be assigned to low-prestige and 
feminine posts and less likely to receive high-prestige portfolios than professional male ministers. 
They have a 7.2% lower probability of attaining a high-prestige position (Model 10), a 21.4% 
higher chance of being appointed to a low-prestige ministry (Model 12), and a 28.3% higher 
likelihood of receiving a feminine post (Model 15) than their male counterparts. In addition, 
female professionals were also 21.6% less likely to hold masculine posts (Model 13). In sum, we 
find that, in East Asia, women tend to be excluded from cabinet power by being assigned to low-
prestige and feminine issue areas rather than key policy areas. However, we also find that 
women are beginning to gain ground in certain issue areas that were male-dominated.  
 The results concerning individual ministers' backgrounds in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that the allocation of cabinet portfolios, particularly key positions, to political and professional 
ministers operates according to a different set of selection criteria. The coefficients on legislative 
experience are positive and statistically significant in Model 4 but fail to reach statistical 
significance in Model 10. According to Model 4, an increase in a political minister's legislative 
experience from its observed minimum to one standard deviation above the minimum values 
leads to 2.4 percentage points increase in the likelihood of a high-prestige appointment. This 
finding indicates that in the allocation of high-prestige posts, legislative experience has a positive 
effect for political ministers but no effect for professional ministers. The coefficients on 
education are statistically significant across most models in Table 3 but fail to attain statistical 
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significance in any models in Table 2. Based on the estimates in Models 10 and 12, an increase 
in a professional minister's education level from its observed minimum to maximum values leads 
to 24.3 percentage points decrease in the likelihood of a high-prestige appointment but 17.5 
percentage points increase in the likelihood of a low-prestige appointment. This finding suggests 
that educational backgrounds play a central role in the distribution of various types of posts to 
professional ministers but a lesser role in the distribution of theses posts to political ministers. 
This finding demonstrates that academic degrees are counted as one of the key elements of 
professional ministers' credentials and also supports our argument that political and professional 
ministers are appointed to cabinet positions according to different selection criteria. Yet, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on age in both Models 4 and 10 indicate that key 
posts tend to go to more experienced individuals. An increase in political and professional 
ministers' age from its observed mean to one standard deviation above the mean values leads to 
9.3 and 6.3 percentage points increase, respectively, in the likelihood of a high-prestige 
appointment. 
 The results related to the factors shaping the political dynamics of executive-legislative 
relations offer interesting implications. In Table 2, presidential constitutional powers have 
negative effects on the allocation of more important posts but positive effects on the allocation of 
less significant posts, while these signs tend to be flipped in Table 3. These findings suggest that 
constitutionally weak presidents may seek legislative support by giving key posts to political 
ministers and avoiding assigning them low-profile posts, whereas more powerful formal 
authority can help presidents to shift their focus to policy effectiveness, enabling them to assign 
prime cabinet posts to professional ministers. In adjusting to variations in formal presidential 
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authority, chief executives not only change cabinet composition (Amorim Neto, 2006; Cheibub, 
2007) but also vary the pattern of portfolio assignments (Lee, 2015).  
 
Conclusion 
The literature on gender and cabinets recognizes women ministers as a group of elites with 
diverse demographic, occupational, and political backgrounds. Existing research also suggests 
that women ministers more often rise to power through professional backgrounds rather than 
through political careers (Arriola & Johnson, 2014; Davis, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-
Robinson, 2009; Siaroff, 2000). However, little is known about why women with particular 
backgrounds are more likely to ascend to power and which policy areas women with different 
backgrounds are more likely to represent than their male counterparts. Recognizing the recent 
rise of female heads of state and legislators in East Asia, an understudied region in the 
comparative literature, this article analyzes the appointment patterns of female ministers, 
distinguishing politicians and professionals, across all East Asian presidential democracies.  
 Employing original data on cabinet formation and minister profiles covering four East 
Asian democracies over 20 years, our analysis demonstrates that there have been indeed different 
patterns of women's ascension to ministerial power between political and professional ministers 
since democratization. While the centralized and exclusionary candidate selection procedures of 
parties in transitional political environments have been unfavorable to female politicians' 
selection into cabinet positions, democratic transition has provided broader avenues for women 
to emerge as professionals outside party politics. With regard to policy areas that women can 
access, although female ministers are commonly more likely to receive minor positions and less 
likely to hold major positions, the different credentials of female politicians and professionals 
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also make them eligible for appointment to different types of portfolios. Our analysis suggests 
that women's cabinet representation has improved overall since democratic transition, but this 
improvement disguises contrasting outcomes in women's cabinet status according to their career 
backgrounds. 
 In analyzing the distinct patterns of women's rise to ministerial power, future work 
should delve into an array of other factors as these patterns may not follow a single path as 
democracies evolve. The mainstream literature on presidential cabinet formation provides a 
complicated mechanism to account for a chief executive's strategy facing diverse institutional 
constraints, but this mechanism has remained gender-blind (Waylen, 2003). In this article, we 
introduced some of the factors shaping the dynamics of executive-legislative relations in the 
institutional separation of powers and briefly looked into their effects on women's cabinet 
representation. Further research along this line, particularly on the contexts conducive to 
women's access to cabinet positions and the incentives driving such appointments, will help to 
better understand the gendered patterns of women's cabinet representation in presidential 
democracies.   
 Our analysis has important political and policy implications for women's descriptive and 
substantive representation. Given the evidence that female members with legislative 
backgrounds have greater experience and knowledge about bill making and may initiate more 
bills than those without such backgrounds (Escobar-Lemmon, Schwindt-Bayer, & Taylor-
Robinson, 2014), limited female representation among political ministers may harm the 
prospects of enacting and implementing policies related to women's issues in East Asian 
governments. Existing research has begun to explore the role of women ministers in policy 
making (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2016), but whether there is any systematic 
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difference in behavior between female politicians and professionals is still unknown. To fully 
understand the causes and consequences of the patterns of women's appointments, we need to 
consider how attributes of individual female ministers may be closely related to their actual 
behavior in presidential cabinets. Such analysis will also have important implications for 
women's substantive representation. 
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1. Time-Series Plots of Female Politicians and Professionals in Cabinets by Country 
 
Note: The plot illustrates the number of female politicians (dashed line) and professionals (solid line) appointed to 
cabinet by country over time.  
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Table 1. Regression Analysis of Women's Appointment to a President's Cabinet 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable 
Percent Female 
Ministers 
Percent Female 
Politicians 
Percent Female 
Professionals 
Log (age of democracy), lagged 0.214*** 0.208 0.118* 
 
(0.000) (0.202) (0.061) 
Constitutional powers -0.011*** 0.001 -0.030* 
 
(0.002) (0.007) (0.012) 
Presidents' support in legislature, % 0.165*** -0.122 0.486*** 
 
(0.058) (0.172) (0.085) 
Electoral cycle 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Term limits 0.091*** 0.154*** 0.069*** 
 
(0.008) (0.037) (0.005) 
Female presidents 0.019* -0.105*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.011) (0.061) (0.017) 
Left party 0.015 -0.083*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.013) (0.027) (0.020) 
Cabinet reshuffle, % 0.095** 0.173* 0.076 
 
(0.040) (0.097) (0.049) 
Women in legislature, % -0.853*** -2.085* -0.548 
 
(0.295) (1.236) (0.497) 
Women in labor force, % -1.210*** -2.625** -0.303 
 
(0.272) (1.026) (0.448) 
Development level 0.299*** 0.295 0.439 
 
(0.098) (0.382) (0.295) 
Constant 0.273 0.773*** -0.026 
 
(0.182) (0.265) (0.566) 
Wald χ2 137.33 67.01 18.74 
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 63 63 63 
Note: The unit of analysis is a country-year. Dependent variables are women's share of cabinet ministers for Model 1, 
women's share of political ministers for Model 2, and women's share of professional ministers for Model 3. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Country-level fixed effects included in all models. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 2. Logit Analysis of Female Politicians' Appointment to Different Types of Policy Positions 
 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Dependent Variable 
High-
prestige 
Medium-
prestige 
Low-
prestige Masculine Neutral Feminine 
Gender -0.755** -0.513*** 1.877*** -1.499 -0.419 3.093*** 
 
(0.361) (0.118) (0.390) (1.273) (0.304) (0.590) 
Age 0.080*** -0.023 -0.091*** 0.029*** -0.014 -0.048** 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.005) (0.006) (0.013) (0.021) 
Education -0.036 0.126 -0.153 -0.130 0.093 0.206 
 
(0.171) (0.294) (0.387) (0.337) (0.212) (0.497) 
Legislative experience 0.031*** -0.025 -0.024 -0.042* 0.057 -0.040 
 
(0.005) (0.029) (0.063) (0.025) (0.040) (0.052) 
Log (age of  3.197 -0.964 -2.928 2.651 1.060 -7.627*** 
     democracy), lagged (2.012) (0.776) (2.950) (2.206) (2.043) (1.569) 
Constitutional powers -0.554*** -0.251** 1.718*** -0.121 -0.403*** 2.440* 
 
(0.207) (0.113) (0.648) (0.122) (0.151) (1.272) 
Presidents' support in  -1.389 2.008*** -2.751 0.052 1.710 -7.669** 
     legislature, % (0.906) (0.494) (3.313) (0.988) (1.588) (3.377) 
Electoral cycle -0.009 0.013 -0.008 -0.020*** 0.014 0.025 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.006) (0.015) (0.018) 
Term limits 0.276* 0.053 -0.336 -0.06 0.134** -0.150 
 
(0.149) (0.157) (0.466) (0.284) (0.057) (0.287) 
Female presidents -0.927*** 0.402* 0.808** -1.818*** 1.342*** 16.08*** 
 
(0.214) (0.213) (0.362) (0.263) (0.315) (2.021) 
Left party -0.407*** 0.268 0.096 -0.153 0.289 -0.523*** 
 
(0.124) (0.226) (0.553) (0.101) (0.264) (0.189) 
Cabinet reshuffle, % -0.101 0.029 0.016 0.737 -0.187 -1.365** 
 
(0.321) (0.462) (0.506) (0.473) (0.294) (0.617) 
Women in  -14.20 3.327 17.70 -12.79 5.190 21.88** 
     legislature, % (12.65) (7.070) (14.66) (10.24) (11.20) (8.815) 
Women in labor  -10.53 -9.009* 47.82* -11.61 -5.764*** 80.54*** 
     force, % (11.17) (5.103) (27.94) (7.547) (2.047) (31.20) 
Development level -6.871 5.187 0.470 -4.654 7.671** -3.378 
 
(4.697) (4.390) (5.839) (3.581) (3.375) (8.326) 
Constant 18.04 7.283 -60.25* 11.31 4.847 -93.09** 
 
(12.97) (7.633) (30.89) (7.200) (4.569) (40.89) 
Wald χ2 20.49 55.06 86.88 5.92 20.22 1088.07 
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 
Note: The unit of analysis is a minister with political backgrounds. Dependent variables: 1 if a minister holds a given 
post. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Country-level fixed effects included in all models.  
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***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
Table 3. Logit Analysis of Female Professionals' Appointment to Different Types of Policy 
Positions  
 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Dependent Variable 
High-
prestige 
Medium-
prestige 
Low-
prestige Masculine Neutral Feminine 
Gender -0.414*** -0.803** 1.616*** -1.159** -0.147 1.713*** 
 
(0.137) (0.327) (0.271) (0.472) (0.395) (0.119) 
Age 0.060*** -0.045** 0.005 0.008 -0.016 0.012 
 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.031) (0.021) (0.020) (0.007) 
Education -0.683*** 0.360*** 0.564*** -0.338** -0.103 0.952*** 
 
(0.078) (0.084) (0.190) (0.159) (0.134) (0.259) 
Legislative experience -0.111 -0.066 0.257 -0.260** 0.090 0.240 
 
(0.284) (0.104) (0.224) (0.103) (0.165) (0.250) 
Log (age of  -1.053 1.202 -0.611 -0.082 0.866 -1.289 
     democracy), lagged (1.676) (1.127) (0.947) (1.424) (1.764) (1.095) 
Constitutional powers -0.005 0.091 -0.091 0.332* -0.177 -0.233*** 
 
(0.097) (0.078) (0.112) (0.172) (0.172) (0.054) 
Presidents' support in  1.686*** -0.046 -2.522** -1.623 1.796 -0.240 
     legislature, % (0.635) (0.919) (1.261) (1.841) (1.526) (1.100) 
Electoral cycle -0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.005 -0.006 -0.0002 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
Term limits 0.417*** -0.088 -0.406 0.525 -0.135 -0.722 
 
(0.094) (0.162) (0.279) (0.425) (0.221) (0.555) 
Female presidents -0.446** 0.532** -0.296 0.296 0.381** -0.773** 
 
(0.188) (0.222) (0.436) (0.257) (0.153) (0.367) 
Left party 0.276*** 0.038 -0.386 -0.260 0.206 0.162 
 
(0.093) (0.193) (0.377) (0.248) (0.194) (0.136) 
Cabinet reshuffle, % -0.084 0.213 -0.234 -0.389 0.552 -0.113 
 
(0.415) (0.217) (0.642) (0.588) (0.338) (0.699) 
Women in  -3.310 -3.661 10.70** -2.380 -7.264 16.19*** 
     legislature, % (7.165) (5.511) (4.264) (6.359) (5.983) (4.116) 
Women in labor  -4.815 3.072 2.804** 13.77* -17.17*** 6.177 
     force, % (7.372) (5.992) (1.237) (7.553) (6.650) (8.681) 
Development level -2.313 -0.035 3.038 0.712 -5.300* 9.353*** 
 
(3.944) (2.155) (6.647) (2.719) (3.073) (2.078) 
Constant 1.206 -2.107 -4.145 -14.05* 16.21*** -9.554* 
 
(6.958) (5.031) (6.238) (7.356) (5.864) (4.998) 
Wald χ2 0.77 2.81 53.33 34.79 74.59 27.69 
Prob > χ2 (0.857) (0.422) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Note: The unit of analysis is a minister with professional backgrounds. Dependent variables: 1 if a minister holds a 
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given post. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Country-level fixed effects included in all 
models. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
